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Abstract 
 
We explore the incidence of sudden stops in capital flows on the incentives for 
building national institutions that secure property rights in a world where 
sovereign defaults are possible equilibrium outcomes. This paper builds upon the 
benchmark model of sovereign default and direct creditor sanctions by Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (1996). In their model it is in the debtor country’s interest to “tie its 
hands” and secure the property rights of lenders as much as possible because this 
enhances the credibility of the country’s promise to repay and prevents default 
altogether. We incorporate two key features of today’s international financial 
markets that are absent from the benchmark model: the possibility that lenders can 
trigger sudden stops in capital movements, and debt contracts in which lenders 
transfer resources to the country at the start of the period, which have to be repaid 
later. We show that under these conditions the advice “build institutions to secure 
repayment at all costs” may be very bad advice indeed. 
 
JEL Classification:  F34; F36; F51 
Keywords: Sudden Stops; National Institutions; Debt Accumulation; Default; 
Sanctions.   4
1. Introduction 
 
Countries wanting to develop are told time and again to “fix your institutions” and “protect 
property rights.” The two are related, for one main task of good institutions is to keep property 
rights from being violated. If countries follow this advice, then presumably traders and investors 
carry out profitable trades and projects and the country prospers.  
International borrowing and lending provides a concrete application of this general 
advice. Countries can guarantee repayment by entering into binding international agreements, 
designing rules or institutions that make non-payment costly or making themselves vulnerable to 
international sanctions. If they do, then capital inflows occur, profitable projects are financed and 
opportunities for international risk-sharing do not go to waste.  
We call this the “tie your hands and prosper” strategy, or THAP. The Washington 
Consensus included THAP among its commandments,
1 and Washington International Financial 
Institutions have been enthusiastically prescribing THAP to their member countries.
2 
In this paper we argue that when applied to international borrowing and lending, the 
THAP strategy may well be incorrect. Or, more precisely, that it is correct only under very 
narrow and specific circumstances. Under other conditions, which are more prevalent in today’s 
financial markets, the advice “build institutions to secure repayment at all costs” may be very 
bad advice indeed.  
Take the standard risk-sharing model of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), for example. The 
model focuses on the insurance aspects of international capital markets (i.e., there is no expected 
gain or loss from borrowing abroad, but borrowing helps shield countries from unexpected 
shocks) and makes the assumption that foreign insurers can credibly make commitments to a 
future state-contingent payment stream, whereas the borrower cannot. Foreign claimholders thus 
have no legal rights to apply sanctions unless the borrower does not comply with the payments. 
They show that unless debt default is ruled out by sufficiently strong sanctions, the borrower can 
never take full advantage of open capital markets to diversify all the risk away and smooth 
consumption. The source of the problem is simple: the borrower can not credibly pre-commit to 
a future state-contingent payment stream. Thus, the prescription is also simple: increase as much 
as possible the share of output that lenders can seize in the event of non-payment. If that share is 
                                                 
1 Williamson (1990). 
2 See, for example, Williamson (2000).   5
one, then the contract offered by lenders will entail full insurance. The country’s consumption 
will be fully stabilized no matter how large the shocks to its income, and the country’s utility will 
be as large as can be.  
In this paper we consider two variations on the simple Obstfeld-Rogoff framework. First, 
lenders are not always well behaved: in any period when lenders have to make a net transfer to 
the country, there is an exogenous probability that transfer will not occur. We can think of this as 
an example of the “sudden stops to capital movements” phenomenon discussed in the by now 
very voluminous literature started by Calvo (1998).
3,  4 Second, consider not only an insurance 
contract but also a debt contract, in which lenders transfer resources to the country at the start of 
the period, which have to be repaid later.  
These apparently minor changes have a strong impact on the policy implications arising 
from the standard international risk-sharing model a la Obstfeld-Rogoff (1996). The first and key 
change is that THAP is no longer optimal. Tying your hands as much as possible, or making 
yourself extremely vulnerable to sanctions, may well decrease rather than increase expected 
country welfare. The reason is that sanctions can be applied because debt repudiation is a 
possible equilibrium outcome in a world with sudden stops. Therefore, by making itself 
vulnerable to sanctions in the aftermath of default, the country is giving away to lenders a greater 
share of output in the event of a crisis.   
The extended model also yields a theory of the optimal size of international debt. In the 
standard model the size of debt is irrelevant. Here that is not the case. The size of debt matters: 
with larger debt, the country gets more relief from non-payment. And that relief may be 
necessary if in equilibrium lenders do not make the net transfers they were supposed to make 
under the contract. We find that the optimal debt stock depends, among other things, on the 
perceived risk of sudden stops. If borrowers expect that lenders will not make the promised 
                                                 
3 A key feature of that literature is that the sudden stops in capital inflows occur for reasons that are exogenous to 
the country. The same is true in our model. Alternatively, in a more complicated setting one could think of this 
sudden stop as the outcome of a coordination problem among lenders, in the spirit of Sachs (1982) and, more 
recently, Morris and Shin (1998). Then, the probability “q” of a sudden stop can be thought of as the probability 
associated with a sunspot in a model with multiple equilibria. See also Rodrik and Velasco (2000). 
4 On the causes of sudden stops, see for example, Calvo Izquierdo and Mejía (2003), Edwards (2004), Cavallo and 
Frankel (2004) and Cavallo (2005). On the consequences of sudden stops see for example, Calvo, Izquierdo and 
Talvi (2003) and Guidotti, Sturzenegger and Villar (2004).   6
transfers, they will want to have more defaultable debt to cushion the adverse consequences of 
sudden stops.
5 
We get these results in a one-period model of a small open economy with a representative 
risk-averse agent (“the borrower”) and a pool of competitive lenders (“the insurers”). The model 
follows the basic structure of the benchmark Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) model but departs from 
it by incorporating badly-behaved lenders and debt contracts.  
This paper is related to the rich literature on sovereign defaults and national institutions 
recently summarized by Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005). A key insight from this literature 
is that to a large extent, international borrowing and lending is feasible because it involves 
repeated interactions between agents and/or because one of the parties can impose direct 
sanctions on the other.  In other words, borrowers pay back their international debts because the 
punishment for non-compliance is the possibly worst outcome of no new lending thereafter (as in 
Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981), or perhaps they pay back because lenders can impose greater 
unilateral sanctions (as in Bulow and Rogoff, 1989). We depart from this body of literature by 
considering the possibility that sovereign default is a strategic decision by borrowers in response 
to prior actions on the part of lenders. In doing so, we shed light on the strategic interaction 
between borrowers and lenders and formulate a novel theory of institutional reform and the 
optimal size of international debt. Methodologically, this paper is similar to Kletzer and Wright 
(2002). These authors have argued that a positive level of sovereign debt can be sustained once 
we introduce a double commitment problem (i.e., neither borrowers or lenders can commit to a 
predictable steam of payments in the future). We focus on the effects that the commitment 
problems of the lenders have on the incentives of the borrowers to undertake institutional 
reforms and for prudent debt management. 
We conclude that institutional reform and the protection of property rights are surely 
desirable goals for all countries. But the prescription for achieving those goals cannot be made 
independently of the international environment that countries face. This paper shows that, if a 
country faces a benevolent external environment in which lenders always behave as they should, 
then maximal protection of lenders’ rights is the optimal strategy for that country. But if 
circumstances are more adverse, with lenders misbehaving from time to time, then THAP may 
                                                 
5 Sachs (1982) makes a similar point, arguing that the default option can be a way for developing countries’ 
borrowers to transfer economic risk to creditors.   7
be counterproductive, and only partial protection of lenders’ property rights is best for the 
borrowing nation. A corollary of these results is that domestic and international reform must be 
undertaken jointly: a better international lending environment, with fewer sudden stops in capital 
movements, makes it more likely that nations will undertake institutional reforms at home.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we set up the basic model and 
define the concept of equilibrium. Then, we compute the equilibrium for different cases by 
resorting to computer simulations. In the last section we present the conclusions. 
 
2.  Basic Model 
 
There is one period. A small open economy with a representative agent borrows and lends 
internationally and produces at home. The representative agent’s expected utility is given by 
() Eu c                                         (1) 
where cis consumption and  () ucis concave. 
Domestic output has two components. The first is random and given by y ε +  where y is 
constant andε  is a random variable of mean zero and support { } , ε ε − . The country borrows an 
exogenous amountd in international credit markets at the beginning of the period and repays at 
the end of the period after uncertainty is realized. Payments ( ) p ε take place in each state of 
nature. We have written ( ) p ε to show that  p may depend on ε  to highlight the “insurance” 
component of international credit markets (more on this below). In particular, we assume 
that ( ) p ε  is a linear function ofε , so ( ) p ε αβ ε = +  where α and β are constants to be determined 
endogenously. The amount borrowed can be invested locally with a linear technology, so that at 
the end of one period the country has(1 ) rd d + > . This is the second component of output. It 
follows that total national output in any given period is (1 ) y rd ε +++ . 
Consumption, in turn, is simply 
(1 ) ( ) cy r dp ε ε =+++ −               (2) 
Foreign lenders are risk neutral and competitive. For them the opportunity cost of funds 
(the world riskless interest rate) is r . Lending will take place so that expected profits by lenders 
are zero. This requires   8
()() ( 1 ) p fd r d
ε
ε εε ε
− =+ ∫               (3)
 
where ( ) f ε is the p.d.f. ofε . 
This setup highlights the “insurance” component of international credit markets, since 
with the world rate of interest equal to the domestic marginal product of capital, there is no 
expected gain or loss from international borrowing. But borrowing does help shield the home 
country from unexpected shocks, since loan repayment can be made contingent on the state of 
nature (the shockε ), in such a way that the country makes relatively larger net payments when 
output is high and relatively smaller payments when output is low. Note that if international 
credit markets did not provide some insurance against stochastic shocks (i.e., 0 β = ), then 
() ( 1 ) p rd ε α ==+ (the borrower would have to pay back the amount owed in any state of 
nature) and consumption would be the state-contingent amountcy ε = + . 
 
2.1 The Case of Full Insurance  
 
Suppose that the borrowing country can pre-commit to pay in all states of nature. Then, the 
representative agent in the country can maximize utility by negotiating a contract with repayment 
schedule such that 1 β = . 
() p ε αε =+                                   (4) 
where α is a constant. Such a contract (i.e., and output-indexed debt contract) provides full 
insurance to the borrower as payments are driven by the realization of the shock. The feasible 
level of α is obtained by substituting (4) into (3): 
() ( ) ( 1 ) f dr d
ε
ε αε εεα
− += = + ∫     (5)
 
It follows that consumption is stabilized at 
(1 ) cy r d y εα ε =+++ −−=        (6) 
This maximizes the utility of the borrower (relative to the no-insurance case), since he gets the 
same average consumption but now with zero variance. Given concave utility, this is welfare-
improving. 
   9
2.2 The Case of Partial Insurance and Sudden Stops 
 
Suppose instead that the borrowing country cannot pre-commit to pay in every state of nature. 
Note that this “incentive” problem arises only if, for a given ε , ( ) 0 p ε > . That is, it is only if the 
borrower is supposed to make payments to the foreign lenders that he can refuse to do. To 
overcome, at least partially, the incentive problem, assume the borrower has an incentive to pay 
because foreign lenders can seize a portion η  ε [0,1] of total national output. Thus, it is 
convenient to repay if 
() ( ( 1 )) p yr d εη ε ≤+ + +               (7) 
The lenders know that the borrower is not totally reliable. This means that if sanctions are 
not high enough (in a sense to be made precise below), in equilibrium there will only be partial 
insurance (i.e., across a limited set of states of nature). To rule out full insurance and make the 
problem interesting we must impose the following. When the shock is at its “best” realization, so 










+ ++                       (8)
 
which we assume from now on. In words, we assume there are realizations of the shock for 
which the borrower would prefer to default and be sanctioned rather than pay what he would 
have to under full insurance. Similarly, we also assume that the sanctions are sufficiently high so 
that the borrower does not always choose to default. For practical purposes, this means that it is 
only for realizations of the shock for which the borrower would be required to make transfers in 
excess of what he was originally lent at the beginning of the period (i.e., ε 's such 
that ( ) (1 ) p rd ε >+ ) that he might refuse to do so. 
Given the nature of the borrower’s incentive problems, an incentive-compatible payment 
contract can be written to prevent misbehavior. This involves a ( ) p ε schedule where the 
maximum payment that the borrower is ever supposed to carry out is (( 1 ) ) y rd ηε +++ —the  
largest payment that can be supported via sanctions. 
Key to our analysis is the assumption that the foreign lenders cannot pre-commit either to 
carry out the required transfers to the borrower. In particular, assume there is a 
probability [0,1] q∈ that lenders will refrain from making additional transfers (i.e., beyond what   10
they originally lent) when the contract calls for them to do so. This problem can arise only if, for 
a givenε ,( )( 1 ) p rd ε <+ . It is only in bad states of the nature for the borrower (i.e., for low 
realizations ofε ) that lenders may be required to provide additional financing. If lenders refrain 
from making additional transfers, we call that a “sudden stop,” following Dornbusch et al. (1995) 
and Calvo (1998). When lenders trigger a sudden stop, the borrowing country can either default 
on (1 ) rd + to “ease the pain” or it can accept the outcome and pay back the debt. If it defaults, 
sanctions are imposed and foreign lenders can seize a portion η  of total national 
output (1 ) y rd ε +++ .  
In that case, end-of-period transfers from the borrower to the lender are 
() ( ( 1 )) p yr d εη ε =+ + +                (9) 
If the borrowing country chooses to repay, end-of-period transfers are simply 
() ( 1 ) p rd ε =+                                (10) 
Note that the probabilistic nature of lenders’ misbehavior cannot be prevented through 
the design of a suitable payment schedule. Thus, sudden stops and defaults can happen in 
equilibrium. Again to make the problem interesting, assume that there are certain realizations of 
the shock ε  at which the borrower will find it convenient to default in the aftermath of a sudden 
stop. Thus, whenε ε =−  it must be true that(1 ) ( (1 ) ) rd y rd ηε +>− + + , and the borrower 









−++                           (11)
 
Combining the two bounds for η derived in this section, we see that the subset of interesting η 
has the upper bound 
(1 ) (1 )
,
(1 ) (1 )
rd rd
Min






++ + ++ − ⎝⎠                      (12)
 
If η is greater than the smaller of these numbers, the problem is uninteresting because there 
would never be an incentive for the borrower to default. 
   11
3. The Incentive-Compatible Contract 
 
Define xas the threshold of the shockε  below which (7) does not bind. By construction 
() ( 1 ) p xr d >+ (because the debtor’s incentive problems arise only if he is required to make a 
transfer to the lenders that exceed what he was originally lent).
6  Next, define z as the threshold 
of the shock ε  below which there can be a sudden stop. By definition,  ( ) (1 ) p zr d =+ (because 
lenders’ incentive problems arise when the additional transfers to the debtor are positive).
7 
Finally, definevas the threshold of the shock at which the borrower is indifferent between 
defaulting and paying back all the debt in the aftermath of a sudden stop. Hence, v satisfies the 
condition(1 ) ( (1 ) ) rd y v rd η +=+ + + , or 
1





⎝⎠                       (13)
. 
In equilibrium,v,z , andxare such that  vzx ε ε − ≤≤≤≤. Note that, vz ≤  is required because 
default in the aftermath of a sudden stop (which happens if v ε < ) can only occur if there is a 
sudden stop (which can happen only if  z ε ≤ ). Also, zx ≤ guarantees that the sanctions are 
sufficiently high so that, for some high realizations ofε , the borrower at least has incentives to 
pay back the initial debt. 
The problem that the borrower solves is 
() Max Eu c  
subject to 
(1 ) ( '''' '''' )  if   
(1 ) ( ''' ''' )   if   
(1 ) ( '' '' )    if   
(1 ) ( ' ' )     if   
yr d v
y rd v z
c
y rd z x
yr d x




⎧⎫ ++ +− + <
⎪⎪
++ +− + ≤< ⎪⎪
= ⎨⎬
++ +− + ≤< ⎪⎪
⎪⎪ ++ +− + ≥ ⎩⎭                   (14)
 
where the endogenous variables are the fourα ’s, the fourβ ’s,  x and  z (all the other variables, 
including v which is given by (13) are exogenous). Furthermore, (7) requires that 
                                                 
6 Recall that we assume that sanctions are high enough to guarantee that the borrower has incentives to pay back the 
debt in good states of nature. 
7 The term “additional” is included to stress that the lenders have already lent the amount d to the borrower.   12
(( 1 ) )
ii yr d α βε η ε +≤+ ++                (15) 
where  i  =  ′,′′,′′′, or ′′′′ according to the four different regions into which the support ofε is 
divided; and subject to (3) which is rewritten as follows: 
(1 ) rd Λ= +                                            (16) 
where 
'''' '''' ''' '''









α εβ ε εα εβ ε ε
αε β ε ε αε β ε ε
−− Λ= + + + +
++ +
∫∫ ∫ ∫
∫∫ ∫∫      (17)
 
Therefore the Langrangian is 
( (1 ) ( '''' '''' ))
( (1 ) ( ''' ''' ))
(( 1 ) ( ' '' ' ) )
(( 1 ) ( '' ) )
'' (( 1 ) )
'' '' ( (1 ) )




















λα βε η ε
ψα βε η ε
φα βε η
− =+ + + − +
++ + + − +
++ + + − +
++ + + − +
⎡⎤ ++ − + + + ⎣⎦














κα β ε η ε
μ
⎡⎤ + ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ++ − + + + ⎣⎦
+Λ −+                     (18)
 
and the first order conditions are: FOC w/r to α′ is 
'( )
xx uc d d
εε
ε λμ ε =+ ∫∫                    (19)
 
FOC w/r to α′′ is 
'( )
xx
zz uc d d ε ψμ ε =+ ∫∫                    (20)
 
FOC w/r to α′′′ is 
'( )
zz
vv uc d d ε φμ ε =+ ∫∫                      (21)
 
FOC w/r to α′′′′ is   13
'( )
vz
v uc d d
ε ε κμ ε
− =+ ∫∫                     (22)
 
FOC w/r to β′ is 
[] '( )
xx uc d d
εε
ε ελ εμε ε =+ ∫∫             (23)
 
FOC w/r to β′′ is 
[] '( )
xx
zz uc d d ε εψ εμε ε =+ ∫∫             (24)
 
FOC w/r to β′′′ is 
[] '( )
zz
vv uc d d ε εφ εμε ε =+ ∫∫              (25)
 




εε ε εκ εμε ε
−− =+ ∫∫        (26)
 
FOC w/r to x is (using Leibniz’s rule) 
( (1 ) ( ' ' )) ( (1 ) ( '' '' ))
(' ' ' ') (' ')
uy rd x uy rd x
xx
εαβ εαβ
μα β μα β
++ +− + − ++ +− +
=+− +            (27)
 
FOC w/r to z is (using Leibniz’s rule) 
( (1 ) ( '' '' )) ( (1 ) ( ''' ''' ))
( ''' ''' ) ( '' '' )
uy rd z uy rd z
zz
εαβ εαβ
μα β μα β
++ +− + − ++ +− +
=+− +           (28)
 
There are four different cases to consider. 
Case 1:  x ε >  
This is in the interval fromxtoε . Here we have that (7) is binding. Therefore payments are equal 
to the largest amount that can be supported via sanctions, 
'' (( 1 ) ) yr d α βε η ε +=+ + +             (29) 
This implies that: 
' β η =                                                  (30) 
and 
'(( 1 ) ) y rd αη =+ +                             (31)   14
Therefore in this region,  () ( ( 1 ) ) py r d ε ηε =+ ++ and (1 )( (1 ) ) cyr d ηε =− +++ . This implies 
that capital markets do not allow the country to insure against the shocks that fall within this 
region. The reason is that the country would be required to make transfers that are bigger than 
what it can credibly commit to pay. 
 
Case 2: zx ε ≤≤ 
In the region fromz tox (7) is not binding. Therefore, 0 λ = and FOC’s (20) and (24) combined 
become 
'( ) [ '( ) ]
xx x x
zz z z uc d d uc d d ε εε ε ε ε ×= × ∫∫ ∫ ∫                 (32)
 
That is, the covariance of  '( ) ucandε  in the interval fromz toxmust be zero. That outcome is 
guaranteed ifc—and therefore  '( ) uc—are constant. In turn, this requires the rule  '' 1 β =  (i.e., 
this guarantees that consumption is constant), so that  (1 ) '' cy r d α = ++ −  where  '' α is a constant 
to be determined below. 
We solve for '' α using FOC (27), which implies 
'' '' ' ' x x α βα β += +                                                (33) 
which, given '' 1 β = ,' β η = and '(( 1 ) ) y rd αη =+ +, is equal to 
'' ( (1 ) ) (1 ) y rd x α ηη =+ + − −                                (34) 
Thus in this region () ( ( 1 )) ( 1 ) py r d x ε ηη ε =+ + − −+  and consumption is constant and given 
by (1 )( (1 ) ) cy r d x η =− ++ +. This implies that capital markets allow the country to insure 
against the shocks that fall within this region. 
 
Case 3: vz ε ≤< 
In this range, incentive compatibility constraint (7) is not binding and 0 φ = . Therefore, the 
situation is similar to Case 2. But there is a caveat: there is now uncertainty about what  ( ) p ε  is. 
With probability(1 ) q − there is no sudden stop, and the situation is formally identical to Case 2 
(and the region vz ε ≤< simply extends the region x ε ≤ ). Therefore payments and consumption   15
are as those in Case 2 (which implies that ''' '' β β = and ''' '' α α = ). But with probabilityqthere is a 
sudden stop. Since v ε ≥ , the borrower does not default and so  ( ) p ε  is given by (10) which 
implies that ''' 0 β = and ''' (1 ) rd α =+ . Thus, consumption in this case iscy ε =+. Therefore, in 
this range, consumption is state-contingent only if there is a sudden stop. 
 
Case 4: v ε <  
This case is identical to Case 3 (because (7) is not binding), with a caveat. If there is a sudden 
stop the borrower now finds it convenient to default on the outstanding debt in order to “ease the 
pain.”
8 This is because the realization of the shock is sufficiently bad so that the portion of the 
stochastic GDP that lenders can capture through sanctions is smaller than the outstanding 
debt(1 ) rd + . Therefore, if there is a sudden stop, then ( ) p ε  is given by equation (9) which 
implies that '''' ' β β =  and '''' ' α α = . Thus,  (1 )( (1 ) ) cyr d ηε =− +++ . Once again, whether 
consumption is state contingent or not depends on whether a sudden stop occurs. 
In cases 3 and 4 capital markets do not allow the country to insure against the shocks that 
fall within these regions. The reason is not (as in Case 1) that the borrower cannot credibly 
commit to repay, but that lenders can trigger a sudden stop. 
 
4. Summing Up 
 
Putting all the pieces together we find that in the optimal contract payments are as follows. With 
probability (1 ) q − (i.e., no sudden stop), 
(1 ) (1 )   if  [ , )
( ) (1 ) (1 )   if  [ , ]
( (1 ) )                 if  ( , ]
y xr d z
pyx r dz x
yr d x
ηη η ε ε
εη ηη ε
ηε ε
⎧⎫ −− + + + −
⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ =− − + + + ⎨⎬
⎪⎪ +++ ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭                          (35)
 
With probabilityq(i.e., sudden stop), 
                                                 
8 If there is no sudden stop, then β′′′=β′′ and α′′′=α′′ because as in Cases 2 and 3, the incentive compatibility 
constraint is not binding and consumption is constant.   16
( (1 ) )                 if  [ , )
(1 )                                  if  [ , )
()
(1 ) (1 )   if  [ , ]












+ ⎪⎪ = ⎨⎬
−− + + + ⎪⎪
⎪⎪ +++ ⎩⎭                          (36)
 
Note that the payment schedule is identical in both cases when z ε > (i.e., when there is 
no risk of sudden stops). For the other cases, since sudden stops are unpredictable ex-ante (they 
occur with probabilityq), default can happen in equilibrium and thus the payment schedule 
depends on whether: (a) there is a sudden stop and, (b) if in the aftermath of a sudden stop the 
borrower defaults. We depict graphically  ( ) p ε  in  
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Payoff Function 
 
 
ε v  z x ε  -ε 
 
 
For all shocksε  that fall in the region x z − , payments increase one to one withε , as the 
borrower transfers to the lenders a constant amount α plus the amountε . This is also the case for 
all shocks that fall in the region between  ε − andz , but only if there is no sudden stop. If there is 
a sudden stop, then a) there is default if ε  falls in the region between  ε −  andv(and therefore 
payments increase at the rate η  as lenders impose sanctions), or b) there is no default if the 
shock falls in the regionzv −  (and therefore payments are flat at (1 ) rd + ). Note that for all   17
shocks such that z ε < only one of the two lines shown in the payoff schedule prevails, depending 
on whether a sudden stop materializes (top line) or not (bottom line). Finally, for all shocks such 
that x ε > , the borrower pays the maximum amount that lenders could otherwise take away 
through sanctions, and so payments increase at the rate η. 
The consumption schedule is shown in Figure 2. With probability(1 ) q − , 
(1 )( (1 ) )  if  [ , )
( ) (1 )( (1 ) )  if  [ , ]
(1 )( (1 ) )  if  ( , ]
y rd x z





⎧⎫ −+ + + −
⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ =− + ++ ⎨⎬
⎪⎪ −+ + + ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭                                (37)
 
and with probability q, 
(1 )( (1 ) )   if  [ , )
                                if  [ , )
()
(1 )( (1 ) )    if  [ , ]















−+ + + ⎪ ⎪
⎪ ⎪ −+ + + ⎩⎭                           (38)
 
Consumption is flat if either the shockε  falls in the regionx z − , or if it falls in the region 
between  ε − andz and there is no sudden stop. In all other cases, consumption is state-contingent 
and given by what the borrower can keep after payments are made. 




ε v  z x -ε    ε 
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  In the next subsection, we solve for the equilibrium values of z and x. 
4.1 The Unknowns z and x 
There are two unknowns,z andx. Solving for the former is easy using equation (28). It implies 
that 










                                       (40) 
which using the values of  ''', '', '' α αβ and ''' β  from Cases 2 and 3, simplifies to: 
(1 )( (1 ) ) zy xr d ηη = − +− ++              (41) 
As  z  is a function of x, we still need to solve for x in order to fully specify the equilibrium. 
In order to solve forxone must use the zero profit condition (3). We have now broken the 
support{ } , ε ε − into five possible intervals according to the thresholdsv,z , andx, and depending 
also on whether there is a sudden stop or not. To obtain a closed-form solution, assume that ε  is 
uniformly distributed with mean zero. Then, the zero profit condition (3) (also re-printed in (16) 
and (17)) can be written as 
(1 ) ( ( (1 ) ) (1 )
22
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Note herexis the only remaining unknown. The solution to (42) is 
() x AB C =−                                            (43)   19
where A, B, and C are functions of the exogenous variablesη ,( 1 ) rd + , y andε  (see appendix for 





5.1 Choosing the Optimalη  
 
Given the nature of the problem and the incentive compatible contract, we now ask what is the 
optimal  η  that the borrower country chooses within the range of interesting cases. In other 
words, given a set of values for all exogenous parameters other thanη , what is the “η ” that 
would allow the borrower country to maximize utility? 
  In what follows, assume that the utility function takes the quadratic form 
2 1
() ( (() ),    
2
uc c c c c ε =− − ≤                      (44) 
wherecis the bliss-point. It is readily verifiable that  '0 u > and '' 0 u < . 
We cannot solve for the optimalη analytically, so we resort to simulations and we look 
for the best among all interesting cases. We define the set of interestingη as those that, given all 
other exogenous variables, satisfy: 
(i) 
(1 ) (1 )
,
(1 ) (1 )
rd rd
Min






++ + ++ − ⎝⎠
. This condition was derived before 
and guarantees that the borrower has incentives to default for some realizations of 
the random variable. 
(ii) η is such that the inequalities vzx ε ε − ≤≤≤≤are all simultaneously satisfied 
(this will determine a lower bound forη that is greater than 0, because the 
sanctions are sufficiently high to guarantee that the borrower does not always 
choose to default). 
Before proceeding with the simulations, we re-write (1) in extensive form: 
                                                 
9 Therefore, given the exogenous variables it is important to verify that in the resulting equilibrium all these 
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where ( ) c ε is defined by (37) and (38) in each region. Note that for every possible η , the values 
ofv,z andxchange and so do ( ) p ε , ( ) c ε , and thus utility. To begin with, we normalize 
1 y GNP == (gross national product), and we set 0.4 ε = (i.e., shocks can be as large as up to 40 
percent of GNP), (1 ) 0.7 rd +=  (i.e., debt represents 70 percent of GNP) and 5 c = . With this 
parameterization, the set of interestingη is (0.43, 0.53). If η is bigger than 0.53, then the problem 
is uninteresting because the borrower does not have incentives to default and we are in a world 
with perfectly enforceable property-rights. If η  is less than 0.43, the borrower always defaults. 
The results are robust to alternative parameterization, as we shall see below.  
  We start with the standard Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) example in which  0 q = . In their 
setup there is no debt, but introducing it is straightforward and does not change the results. The 
simulations in Figure 3 show that setting the highest possible η is always in the best interest of 
the debtor. The reason is that, as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) state, “As η rises, consumption can 
be stabilized across more states of nature, to the country’s benefit. The sanctions are never 
exercised in equilibrium anyway, so their role here is the positive one of enhancing the 
credibility of the country's promise to repay” (p. 360). 
Figure 3. Expected Utility with q=0 (Benchmark case) 
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With or without debt this conclusion is the same because a) with zero profits for lenders, holding debt is not 
costly and b) the optimal payment contract is set so that the sanctions are never carried out. But things 
change when we allow for the possibility of a sudden stop by setting 0 q > . This simple perturbation makes a 
big difference, since it allows for default as an equilibrium outcome. The simulation results in Figure 4 and  
Figure 5 show that now the relation between η and expected utility is no longer 
monotonic, but hump-shaped. 
 





Figure 5. Expected Utility with q=0.5 (Benchmark case) 
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Unlike the case 0 q = , with sudden stops the optimal value of η  from the debtor’s point 
of view is always less than the maximum value. Increasing η  up to a certain threshold is 
beneficial because of the credibility-enhancing effect. But raising η also exposes the country to 
greater sanctions in the event of default. The adverse effect of raising η is stronger for higher 
values ofq. The intuition behind this result is simple: increasing η enhances the credibility of the 
country’s promise to repay. But raising η also reduces consumption in the aftermath of a crisis 
because it increases what lenders can take away through sanctions if there is default—and   
defaults do happen in equilibrium. In other words, a higher η  reduces the attractiveness of 
default as an insurance against sudden stops.  
  The point can also me made graphically. In Figure 6 we plot x,  z , and vagainst η  to 
show how increasing η  generates a trade-off between expanding region x z −  (i.e. the 
consumption-smoothing region) vis-à-vis expanding regionzv −  (i.e. the region where in the 
aftermath of a sudden stop the borrower does not default). 
 
Figure 6. x, z, and v (Benchmark case) 
 
 
Interestingly, when we superimpose the expected utility graphs for different q’s in 
Figure 7 we find that both, the optimal η  and the borrower’s utility fall asqincreases. This 
means that the first best outcome from the borrower’s point of view would be to set the   23
maximum possible η  (as in the standard Obstfeld and Rogoff model), but only if he can be 
guaranteed that there will not be sudden stops (i.e.,  0 q = ). 
 




These results are robust to different parameter values. We have performed a battery of 
sensitivity tests to verify that our results are not driven by an arbitrary set of values for the 
exogenous variables. Next, we show the same set of graphs for the case when 
1 y = (normalization), 0.7 ε = (shocks can be as large as up to 70 percent of GNP), and 
(1 ) 0.5 rd += (so debt represents 50 percent of GNP). This alternative parameterization has the 
effect of expanding the set of interestingη  to (0.37, 0.55) because there is now a wider set of 
possible shocks. Reassuringly, all the qualitative results remain unchanged.   
  We start again with the case when 0 q = in   24
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Let us now explore the intuition for this result again. Recall that in principle, there are 
two types of borrower default that could happen in this model. The first one is when the 
borrower unilaterally decides not to pay in “good” states of nature (i.e., high realizations ofε ), 
while the other (pure debt-default) is triggered as a response to a sudden stop. When 0 q = , the 
latter is ruled out. The first one is eventually prevented by the incentive-compatible payment 
contract. This involves a schedule where the maximum payment that the borrower is ever 
supposed to carry out is the largest payment that can be supported via sanctions. With greater 
sanctions, the credibility of the borrower’s promise to repay, and consequently its 
creditworthiness, increase. There is no setback to the borrower in raisingη  because the sanctions 
are not exercised. 
  This conclusion changes when 0 q > . In that case, default in the aftermath of a sudden 
stop is a possible outcome and therefore sanctions are a real possibility. This is illustrated in 
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When sanctions are a real threat, the borrower needs to weigh the advantages against the 
disadvantages of increasing η . The advantages have to do, as before, with the credibility- 
enhancing effect, the disadvantages relate to the real possibility that sanctions might be 
exercised. Note that as the probability of a sudden stop increases (i.e., asqincreases), so does the 
probability of default. The reason is that default can only happen conditional on the occurrence 
of a sudden stop, so the two phenomena are linked. As sanctions are only imposed in the 
aftermath of a debt default, the relative importance of the disadvantages of raising η  increase   27
with the probability of debt-default. This is the reason why in Figure 10 with  50% q = , the 
decreasing portion of the expected utility line is more extended than in Figure 9, where  30% q = . 
  The advantages and disadvantages of raising η are also illustrated in Figure 11 where we 
plot v,z , andxagainstη . 




Just as before, with the new parameterization we observe how increasing η  generates a 
trade-off between expanding region  x z −  (i.e., the consumption-smoothing region) vis-à-vis 
expanding region zv −  (i.e., the region where in the aftermath of a sudden stop the borrower 
does not default). The region zv −  expands as η  increases because it becomes less convenient 
for the borrower to default and face the sanctions. Yet the alternative to default is to pay back the 
debt in full. Thus, raising η  exposes the borrower to more payments in the aftermath of a sudden 
stop and simultaneously decreases the attractiveness of default as a form of relief from sudden 
stops. 
  Finally, Figure 12 shows that the borrower would prefer to live in a world where 
sanctions for misbehavior are high and  0 q = , but the threat of misbehavior (i.e., choosing a η  
below the maximum feasible) is the optimal response in a world where sudden stops are possible 
(i.e., 0 q > ).  
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  Graphs for other parameter values are available from the authors upon request. 
 
5.2 Choosing the Optimal d 
 
Suppose that η  is fixed and that, given a set of values for all other exogenous variables, the 
country chooses the level of debt that maximizes utility. Sinceη  is now fixed, equivalent 
restrictions on the interesting values of η  apply presently tod . Therefore, we define the set of 
interestingd 's as those that, given a set of values for all other exogenous variables, satisfy: 
(i) 
(1 ) (1 )
,
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
dM a x
rr





. This condition guarantees that there are 
incentives for the borrower to default in certain occasions.
10 
(ii) d is such that the inequalities vzx ε ε − ≤≤≤≤are all simultaneously satisfied 
(this defines an upper bound ford because, given the sanctions, if the debt level is 
too high then the borrower will never have incentives to pay back and there is no 
possible equilibrium). 
                                                 
10 This condition is the reciprocal of condition (i) in the previous case. Ifd is not greater than the greater of these 
two bounds, then there are no realizations of the shock for which the borrower prefers to default and be sanctioned 
rather than repay. There are two bounds because one applies to good and the other to bad states of nature. Note that 
both bounds are, ceteris paribus, decreasing inε  (i.e., bigger shocks have the effect of lowering the minimum 
threshold of debt that supports an equilibrium with incentive problems), and increasing inη  (i.e., countries exposed 
to more sanctions have to have more debt to be tempted to default).   29
  We proceed with the same simulations of the previous section but for the interestingd ’s 
instead ofη ’s. We set again  1 y = (normalization), 0.4 ε = (i.e., shocks can be as large as up to 40 
percent of GNP),  5 c = . We also fix  0.46 η = . With this parameterization, the set of 
interestingd ’s is (0.52,0.80). Ifd is less than 0.52, then the problem is uninteresting because the 
borrower does not have incentives to default. Ifd is greater than 0.80, then the stock of debt is so 
high that the borrower will always default. 
  We start with the standard case where 0 q = . The simulation results in  
Figure 13 show that setting the lowest possibled is always in the best interest of the debtor. 
 




The intuition for this result is as follows: because high levels of debt make it, ceteris 
paribus, more tempting for the borrower to curtail payments in good states of nature, the 
incentive compatible repayment contract is necessarily more stringent. Thus, minimizingd raises 
the welfare of the borrower by allowing him to smooth consumption across more states of nature. 
In other words, reducing the level of debt serves as a substitute to raising η : it raises the 
credibility of the borrower’s promise to repay and, thereby, its creditworthiness. But things 
change when we allow for the possibility of sudden stops by setting  0 q > . When sudden stops 
can happen in equilibrium, borrowers have the option of defaulting to reduce the pain. Having 
higher levels of debt makes this relief more powerful, because after default the borrower retains a 
fraction (1 ) η − of what he owes. The simulation results in Figure 14 and Figure 15 make two 
points. First, with 0 q > expected utility is hump-shaped in the stock of debt, and the optimal debt   30
level is interior. The intuition for this result is that when there is risk of sudden stops, the 
borrower weights the credibility enhancing advantages of having a lower stock of debt, against 
the disadvantages stemming from the reduced cushion against sudden stops. Asη  is now fixed, 
the level of debt is the adjusting valve: just as before the borrower could secure more resources 
in the aftermath of default by choosing the level of η  to reduce sanctions, he can now do the 
same thing by choosing a higher level of defaultable debt. Second, the optimal debt stock is 
increasing in q. The higher the risk of a sudden stop, the better it is to have a larger debt level in 
order to “ease the pain” of a sudden stop through default. Because debt serves to cushion the 
adverse effects of sudden stops, the advantages of raisingd increase withqand gradually 
outweigh the disadvantages. 
 
Figure 14. Expected Utility with q=0.3 (Benchmark case) 
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Figure 15. Expected Utility with q=0.5 (Benchmark case) 
 
 
   
The intuition for this result can also be seen graphically. In  
Figure 16, we show that the intervalzv − shrinks asd increases, meaning that increasing the level 
of debt makes the option of default more appealing. Yet this comes at the expense of reducing 
the possibility of smoothing consumption, since the regionx z − is also shrinking ind . The 
relative weights assigned to the advantages and disadvantages of raisingd depend on the 
likelihood of sudden stops. With 0 q = , only the disadvantages matter, but with  0 q > the 
advantages also weigh in. 
 
Figure 16. x, z, and v (Benchmark case) 
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Finally, note that when we superimpose the expected utility graphs for different values of q  in  
Figure 17, we find that the optimal level of debt increases with q, but that utility levels 
fall as q increases. Thus, the first-best for the borrower would be to set the minimum possibled , 
but the first best is not attainable when the borrower perceives the risk of sudden stops. 
 





The results in this section are qualitatively robust to alternative parameter values. For 
example, below we set again 1 y =  and  5 c = , but we expand the support of the shock by setting 
0.7 ε = (i.e., shocks can be as large as up to 70 percent of GNP) and we set more severe 
sanctions, 0.6 η = . With this parameterization, the set of interestingd ’s is now (0.8,1.35). Note 
that the minimum level of debt that supports an equilibrium where there are incentive problems 
is now higher. The intuition behind this result is that an economy that is exposed to greater 
sanctions needs a large stock of debt to be tempted to default and face the sanctions. We begin 
again with the case when  0 q =  in Figure 18. Recall that this is the case when the possibility of 
default is completely ruled-out by a suitable incentive compatible contract. Therefore the 
borrower is always better-off by minimizing the stock of debt. Additional debt only has the effect 
of making the resulting contract more stringent, thus limiting the possibilities of consumption 
smoothing. 
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Instead, when  0 q > , default becomes a possible equilibrium outcome. Thus, the stock of debt can be used as 
insurance against sudden stops. There are now advantages to the borrower associated to raisingd . In  
Figure 19 and Figure 20, it is shown that the advantages of increasingd can quickly 
outweigh its disadvantages. 
 




Figure 20. Expected Utility with q=0.5 (alternative parameter values) 
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For a predetermined level of sanctions, as the borrower can always retain a 
fraction(1 ) η − of what he owes if he decides to default, it is in his best interest to acquire more 
debt than what he would if he felt safe (i.e.,  0 q = ). The higher the perceived risk, the more debt 
he wants to acquire. 
  Given that raisingd has the effect of increasing the resources that the borrower can keep 
in the aftermath of a sudden stop if he decides to default, it also increases the attractiveness of 
the “default” option. This point is made graphically in Figure 21. 
 
  Figure 21. x, v, and z (alternative parameter values) 
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Note that asd increases, the segmentzv −  shrinks. Recall that for all shocks that fall 
within the segment zv − , the borrower does not default in the aftermath of a sudden stop. Thus, 
as the segment shrinks, it becomes more likely that the borrower will default if there is a sudden 
stop. Also, note how increasingd also shrinks the segment x z − , reflecting the fact that more 
debt reduces the creditworthiness of the borrower. Therefore, increasingd imposes a trade-off to 
the borrower between reduced creditworthiness, and more insurance against sudden stops. 
   When we superimpose all the expected utility graphs in  
Figure 22 we observe that it is again true that the borrower would prefer to live in a world where 
there is no risk of sudden stops and thus minimize the stock of debt. But an uncertain world leads 
to over-indebtedness, because debt works as self-insurance against sudden stops. 
 




  Graphs for any other parameterization are available from the authors upon request. 
6. Conclusions 
 
The message of this paper is simple: in the presence of sudden stops in capital movements, 
borrower countries do not have incentives to build national institutions that secure the property 
rights of investors, as those guarantees might backfire if the country is forced to default. 
Similarly, they might choose to over-indebt as a way to self-insure against probable sudden 
stops.    36
Forcing or recommending countries to behave differently will not work unless those 
countries perceive that the world is also a safe place. This implies that strategies like THAP, 
which are embedded in policy prescriptions currently fashionable in many Washington-based 
multilateral institutions, can work only if they are accompanied by a better international lending 
environment with fewer sudden stops in capital movements. 
This paper extends the benchmark model of sovereign default and direct creditor 
sanctions of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), by incorporating two key features of today’s financial 
markets that have a strong impact on the policy implications: first, lenders are not always well 
behaved because they can trigger sudden stops in capital movements; and second, we consider 
not only insurance contracts, but also debt contracts. 
 We do not claim that either institutional reform to secure property rights, or prudent debt 
management policies, is an undesirable objective. On the contrary, we show that borrowers’ 
would be interested in pursuing those policies, which we call THAP, but not under the conditions 
prevalent in today’s international financial markets. Instead, a more stable international lending 
environment would go a long way towards promoting the correct incentives for countries to 
undertake THAP policies. 
The corollary of this is that domestic and international reform must be undertaken jointly: 
a better international lending environment, with fewer sudden stops in capital movements, makes 
it more likely that nations will undertake institutional reforms at home.    37
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Appendix 
 
In the appendix we solve (42) to getx. We begin by normalizing y  
1 y ≡                          (46) 
Next, for notational simplicity let: 
(1 ) rd D + ≡               (47) 
and 
w ε =                          (48) 
Finally, recall from (41) that 
(1 )( ) zy x D ηη =− + − +                   (49) 
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and solve for x. This equation has two roots: 
() x AB C =−                     (51) 
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It turns out that for all qand (0,1) η∈ (and any value ofD) only the first root satisfies the 
condition that [, ] x ε ε ∈− . Therefore we drop the second root. 